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 Abstract 
In this paper and the next I discuss Peter Singer’s approach to answering the question 
of how one ought to live with nonhuman animals. In the first paper I situate Singer’s 
work within the larger historical context of moral concern for animals, looking at 
previous public consensus on the issue, its breakdown and its re-emergence with 
Singer in the 1970s. In the second paper, I take a closer look at Singer’s highly 
influential book, Animal Liberation (1975), and argue that as activist literature, his 
chapter on animal experimentation for example can be seen as morally persuasive in 
ways other than simply as an example of (the consequences) of speciesism. How I do 
this is to place Singer’s work side by side that of 19th century activist Francis Power 
Cobbe’s, in particular her pamphlet Light in Dark Places (1883), and examine their 
work against the criticisms from scientists defending the practice of animal 
experimentation.  
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Peter Singer played a key role in bringing a particular moral problem to light; he came 
to name this problem in a now famous philosophical treatise. Animal Liberation was 
first published as a review essay in The New York Review of Books (NYRB) and two 
years later, in 1975, as a full-length book published by the New York Review. Of 
Singer himself, we might describe him as both a thinker and a doer, a philosopher and 
an activist. He is at once a reformer involved in making a moral problem public, a 
professional exercising cognitive authority, and a philosopher writing moral theory 
(Addelson, 1995: 29). In this chapter I will discuss some of the important ways in 
which moral concern for animals was brought to light and how certain things people 
were doing to/with animals were established as matters of common concern, 
concentrating in particular on Peter Singer’s contribution and involvement in the 
process.  
 
 
In so doing I will loosely draw on two concepts of practical import. They are 'social 
worlds' and 'arenas' (Addelson, 1993: 276). Briefly, ‘social worlds’ are worlds of 
‘knowers’ and ‘doers’, or ‘knower/doers’ who collectively perform particular sorts of 
actions to produce those worlds and whose interactions involve the creation of and 
struggle over moral problems. They are ‘knowers’ because they organise and interpret 
the knowledge regarding the moral problem(s) of their concern and indeed create the 
definitions by which the problem is known. They are ‘doers’ because they participate 
in the process by which the problem is brought to light. ‘Arenas’ refer to sites of 
contestation, where social worlds or sub-worlds of social worlds come together to 
resolve, or attempt to resolve, their differences (Addelson, 1993: passim).  
 
Several social worlds will be referred to throughout this discussion. Some concern 
families, friends, and acquaintances; others concern academic professions including 
the philosophical and the scientific and still others concern thinker/doers involved in 
animal advocacy at a grassroots level. These worlds and the tensions between them 
will help to illuminate some of the important ways in which concern for animals as a 
moral problem came to light. While Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation marks a 
particularly important moment in the modern history of concern for animals and is 
indeed the main focus of this discussion, I will begin with a brief historical sketch of 
moral concern for animals so as to contextualise the debate, concentrating in 
particular on vivisection as an arena contestation. 
 
 
Previous consensus and its breakdown: a brief historical survey 
In terms of moral consensus, concern for animals has at various times and in various 
places been more publicly endorsed than at other times. For example, in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century Britain, public concern for the plight of particular groups of 
animals had taken hold. Various organisations were formed advocating the proper 
care and treatment of both wild and domestic animals. The Society for the Prevention 
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of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was formed in 1824, two years after legislation 
protecting animals from cruelty – the first of its kind – was passed in British 
Parliament. Royal patronage was accorded in 1840, thus becoming the Royal Society 
for the Prevention and Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)) (Kean, 1998: 35). The Animal 
Friends’ Society and the Rational Humanity Group soon followed, and in 1859 the 
Metropolitan Drinking Fountain and Cattle Trough Association (MDFCTA) was 
formed, providing for the first time free fresh drinking water to weary animal and 
human travellers on their journeys to or through various metropolitan areas in Britain 
(Kean, 1998: 54). In the late 1800s the Horse Accident Prevention Society and the 
Battersea Dogs’ Home were founded along with several anti-vivisection societies 
concerned for what they saw as the horrific cruelty enacted upon mostly domestic 
animals by the men of science.  
 
In the late 1870s Frances Power Cobbe, a woman at the forefront of several reform 
movements including the emancipation of women, children and the poor, founded the 
Victoria Street Society; an organisation dedicated to the cessation of vivisectional 
practice. The Society eventually split into two becoming the National Anti-Vivisection 
Society (NAVS) led by Stephen Coleridge (great grandson of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge) and the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV), more or 
less led by Cobbe herself (Kean, 1998: 110). Cobbe wrote extensively on the issue of 
vivisection and her Light In Dark Places (1883), a pamphlet ‘intended to 
convey…ocular illustration of the meaning of the much disputed word Vivisection’ 
will be the subject of some discussion later in this chapter (Cobbe, 2004 (1883): 293). 
 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries strong opposition to cruelty 
towards animals persisted, with women continuing to play pivotal roles in exposing 
and opposing the brutality of various practices involving animals. Against the practice 
of vivisection, the militant actions of Louise Lind af Hageby and Leisa Schartau stand 
out along side those of Frances Power Cobbe.  Like Cobbe before them, Hageby and 
Schartau brought to light the practices of particular experimenters with the publication 
of their work, but unlike Cobbe in her tactic of reprinting drawings and extracts from 
the physiologists own pen and distributing the reprints to the public, the two women 
offered first-hand accounts of what they witnessed in physiology classes taught by 
William Bayliss at the University of London in 1903 (Kean, 1998: 139).  
 
The publication of their accounts set in place a series of events now seen to be central 
to the history of the vivisection debate in Britain, and indeed to the process by which 
a concern for animals as a moral problem was brought to light. The descriptions of 
what the women saw later became the basis of their book entitled The Shambles of 
Science, the manuscript of which was read by Stephen Coleridge, and later published 
by NAVS in 1903 (Ryder, 2000: 135). The publication led William Bayliss to sue 
Coleridge for libel, with Bayliss obtaining a guilty verdict of defamation against 
Coleridge and damages of 2000 pounds (Elston, 1987: 285). The book and the trial 
served to sway public opinion in favour of Hageby, Schartau, Coleridge and their 
cause, with many letters being sent to the press and money donated to help pay for the 
fine (Ryder, 2000: 135). Hageby and Shartau withdrew their book for revision, 
removing the chapter that was the cause of much of the controversy and republished 
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the rest under the title The Shambles of Science: Extracts from the Diary of Two 
Students of Physiology. 
  
The contentious chapter, entitled ‘Fun’, described not only a particular vivisection in 
progress but also the interactions of the participants involved and so exposed the 
social world of the scientists, or more specifically, the scientific sub-world of 
physiology, to the greater public. Some forty years or so earlier Claude Bernard, a 
French physiologist of some repute and an avid supporter of vivisectional practice, 
described the physiologist thus:  
[He] is not an ordinary man: He is a scientist, possessed and absorbed by the 
scientific idea he pursues. He does not hear the cries of animals, he does not 
see their flowing blood, he sees nothing but his idea, and is aware of nothing 
but an organism that conceals from him the problem he is seeking to solve. 
(Greek & Greek, 2001: 29) 
Hageby and Shartau’s account tells a very different story and it was, in large part, 
their descriptions of the behaviour of the participants themselves that caused much of 
the uproar that ensued. The chapter begins with an extract from British novelist, Hall 
Caine, describing how the vivisector and his work are seen, morally speaking.  
His weary eyes…were full of the measureless pity that is in the eyes of the 
surgeon who is about to vivisect of a dumb creature because it is necessary 
for the welfare of the human race. (Lind-af-Hageby & Schartau 2002 
(1903): 155)  
 
The extract provided the authors with a useful literary and philosophical foil to the 
experiences the two women come to describe.  According to their account, the 
participants at the lecture on ‘The Mechanism of the Secretory Process’ demonstrate 
collective behaviour more akin to entertainment than medical education. ‘There is 
nothing of the serene dignity of science about the place’, the women write, 
‘everybody looks as if he expected an hour’s amusement; if he gets instruction in the 
bargain—well, it is all the better’ (Lind-af-Hageby & Schartau 2002 (1903): 156). 
They go on to describe how a dog is carried into the lecture room atop an operation-
board, to which its legs, body and head are firmly fixed, and who is subsequently cut 
up and had its internal organs exposed and manipulated. A large incision in the neck, 
made some time earlier by the lecturer, exposes the gland that is the focal point of the 
lecture. Unfortunately the gland does not behave as it should throughout the 
experiment, but this, the women write, seemed of little concern or consequence to the 
lecturer or his students; rather it became a source of amusement. They write:  
 
The rate of flow [of saliva] ought now to be “greatly accelerated”, but it 
does not behave nicely and refuses to be accelerated. Laughter and applause. 
And again, 
The saliva once more clearly demonstrates its want of salivary education 
and appears like a gush from a waterfall. Roars of laughter and uproarious 
stamping of feet.  (Lind-af-Hageby & Schartau 2002 (1903): 156) 
 
Later, they say, when describing earlier experiments he had conducted on dogs in a 
tone similar to that employed during the lecture itself, the experimenter elicits more 
laughter and applause from the students. In all, according to the authors, a spirit of 
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jocularity prevailed throughout the lecture, with loud conversations, jokes and 
laughter commonplace. Regarding the subject of the experiment, his futile attempts at 
escape were also a source of mirth: ‘the dog will not run away nor will he offend our 
ears by any loud yelps; besides, if he did try both it would be rather amusing’ (Lind-
af-Hageby & Schartau 2002 (1903): 156). Further, the women describe how, when the 
lecturer re-enters the laboratory, ‘the dog’s struggles are changed into convulsive 
trembling of the whole body’. ‘This is nothing unusual’, they say, ‘the animals seem 
to realise the presence of their tormentors long before these touch them’ (Lind-af-
Hageby & Schartau 2002 (1903): 156). Upon completion of the lecture, the lecturer 
rings a bell and the attendant disconnects the operation-board from the electrical 
apparatus, removing the dog and board from the theatre, although not before banging 
and stumbling through the door further adding to the general jollity of the participants 
(Lind-af-Hageby & Schartau 2002 (1903): 157). Recalling Caine’s words, the women 
end their chapter: ‘what a lovely picture! But things are not so beautifully sentimental, 
and the welfare of the human race is sometimes rather far away’ ((Lind-af-Hageby & 
Schartau 2002 (1903): 157). 
 
As it was later revealed the dog in question had been subjected to a series of 
vivisections over several months, culminating in the one attended and described by 
Hageby and Schartau, after which it was killed (Ryder, 2000: 135). Hageby and 
Schartau’s book and Coleridge’s trial received widespread public attention, an 
unexpected outcome of which was the erection of a bronze statue in Battersea in 
1906, with full Council approval, commemorating the Brown Dog referred to by the 
two women. The inscription read, complete with capitalization for emphasis:  
In Memory of the Brown Terrier Dog Done to Death in the Laboratories of 
University College in February 1903, after having endured Vivisection 
extending over more than Two Months and having been handed over from 
one Vivisector to Another Till Death came to his Release. Also in memory 
of the 232 dogs Vivisected at the same place during the year 1902. Men and 
women of England, how long shall these Things be? (Kean, 1998: 153).  
 
Deliberately provocative, the statue became the focal point for numerous riots, 
protests and demonstrations by pro and anti vivisection supporters alike. Richard 
Ryder (2000: 136) describes the violent nature of some of the protests involving 
medical students attempting to remove the statue and local Battersea citizens 
defending it. Over a number of weeks in 1907 mobs of students, some numbering in 
the 1000s, marched in protest shouting slogans defending their professors, some even 
resorting to violently invading women’s suffrage meetings, one of which Louise Lind 
af Hageby was attending at the time (Ryder, 2000: 136). Despite their protests though, 
‘parliament, the Battersea Borough Council, and public opinion generally, sided with 
the brown dog’ (Ryder, 2000: 136). Three years later however, the statue was 
removed by Council and likely destroyed despite a petition signed by over 20,000 
locals to have it remain where it was (Kean, 1998: 153). In turn, several thousand 
people attended a protest meeting in Trafalgar Square over its removal, including 
representatives from a number of trade unions (Ryder, 2000: 136). In the end however 
the statue was neither returned nor replaced. The Brown Dog Affair, as it came to be 
known marked a significant moment in the history of contestation over vivisection. 
The Affair, which had begun with the publication of personal descriptions exposing 
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the behaviour and practices of the scientific world, culminated in a level of public 
protest yet unseen over the mistreatment of animals.  
 
With the advent of two world wars and certain advances made in science claimed to 
be in large part due to experiments on animals, the animal welfare movement, in 
Ryder’s words, stagnated. ‘The animal welfare organisations, dominated by middle-
class women, continued their good work’, but he says, ‘without the mass support 
which they had enjoyed before the war’ (Ryder, 2000: 142). During the mid to late 
1920s, more than 1300 animals were killed in chemical warfare experiments and by 
1944 over 1.3 million experiments of various kinds were conducted annually 
throughout Britain (Kean, 1998: 180). Outside Britain, biomedical research 
proliferated during the twentieth century, particularly in the United States. American 
scientists were paid more, had a higher professional status than their European 
counterparts and importantly faced little or (next to) no opposition to their 
experimental practices from anti-vivisection organisations such as those in existence 
in Britain (Monamy, 2000: 26).   
 
In the years during and following the first world war, anti-vivisection societies in 
Britain faced not only a downturn in support, but female members in particular faced 
a new and potentially damaging threat to their cause.  Hilda Kean writes that:  
The suggestion that those who campaigned on behalf of animals were out of 
tune with the times was increasingly directed towards women. In the same 
way that the cause of animals had received a boost when linked with 
suffrage feminism before the war, now in a time of backlash against 
feminism such women bore the brunt of hostile criticism (Kean, 1998: 181).  
The potential link between women and sentimentalism was something Richard Ryder 
claims Frances Power Cobbe was only too keenly aware of and only by ‘cleverly 
associating her feminism with an aura of respectability and moral conservatism’ was 
she able to make it difficult for critics to discredit both her and her work (Ryder, 
2000: 142). In the years following her death attitudes such as those expressed by 
French physiologist Elie de Cyon were becoming more commonplace. de Cyon 
suggested that the animal welfare issue was merely an ‘outlet for frustrated old 
maids’, and that while spinsters in Catholic countries took to convents, in Protestant 
countries such women ‘directed their ‘disordered minds’ towards anti-vivisection’ 
(Ryder, 2000: 142). This unfortunate link between women and a sentimentalist 
approach to animal welfare seems, for the most part, to have persisted throughout 
much of the 20th century, despite the achievements of such women as Frances Power 
Cobbe, Louise Lind af Hageby and Leisa Schartau (and the many more of their era 
uncited here). 
 
The attitude which developed towards female members of animal welfare 
organisations is a useful indicator of how far moral consensus had waned concerning 
the plight of animals: associated with ‘womanish’ sentiment, the issue no longer held 
public attention. Given this, the significance of the opening anecdote to Animal 
Liberation is made plain. The anecdote describes two seemingly older British women 
caught in the grip of confused sentimentalism towards animals. The women had heard 
Peter Singer was writing a book about animals and so invited him and Renata (his 
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wife) to tea, the women themselves having written a book about animals some time 
earlier. Singer writes:  
When we arrived our hostess’s friend was already there, and she certainly 
was keen to talk about animals. “I do love animals,” she began…and she 
was off. She paused while refreshments were served, took a ham sandwich, 
and then asked us what pets we had. (Singer, 1976: x) 
The anecdote operates as a useful counterpoint by which Singer distances his work 
and begins to re-establish concern for animals as a public problem: how one does this, 
Singer goes on to argue, is not through sentimentalism but through reasoned, rational 
inquiry. Interestingly, as I shall show later, features of his work, particularly 
concerning the middle chapters of Animal Liberation, share common strategies with 
those of the early (female) campaigners Cobbe, Shartau and Hageby. For now though 
Singer’s involvement in the process by which concern for animals came to light must 
be considered in more detail. 
 
 
The (re)emergence of consensus: Animal Liberation 
I think [I am most proud of] Animal Liberation. I’ve changed a few 
things in the second edition, but basically it’s a book that’s stood the 
test of time. The other thing I’m pleased with is that people keep 
coming up to me and saying, “Your book changed our lives. We’ve 
abandoned exploiting animals and are involved in the movement.” I 
am pleased both personally and as a professional philosopher to have 
shown that philosophy and rational argument can make a difference.  
(A Conversation with Peter Singer, Part I, 1994)  
 
Peter Singer participated in a variety of social worlds important to the process by 
which concern for animals as a moral problem came to light. I will use some of these 
worlds to trace the formation and growth of the modern animal advocacy movement 
and to mark certain aspects of Singer’s own moral passage. The initial stages of his 
moral passage concerns the ‘Informal Oxford Group’ (IOG), a tag borrowed from 
Richard Ryder to denote a particular group of thinker/doers active at a particular time 
and in a particular place to which both he and Peter Singer belonged (Ryder, 2000: 6). 
How this group in their collective action together worked to make this problem public 
is crucial to the movement and so constitutes our starting point.  
 
In his autobiographical account of the animal liberation movement Singer tells us that 
prior to his awakening regarding the plight of animals, the ‘connections between [his] 
philosophical studies and [his] everyday life would have been hard to discern’ 
(Singer, 1986: 148). One of the important things we can infer from this is that in 
aligning the two – that is, in aligning his professional and ‘everyday’ lives or worlds – 
he believed he had found an answer to how we should live with animals. It was to be 
a view shared by the other members of the IOG and one that characterised their 
struggle in bringing the moral problem of animal suffering to light.  
 
In 1969 Singer had moved to Oxford to pursue his aspirations of an academic career 
in ethics and political philosophy. He tells us that he had no distinctive views about 
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the ethical treatment of animals other than he disapproved of cruelty; to his mind 
animal welfare was ‘as a cause for kindly old ladies rather than for serious political 
reformers’ (Singer, 1986: 149). It was a chance meeting with Richard Keshen, also a 
student in philosophy, that was to change his life and set in motion a series of events 
that would later become the foundations of the modern animal liberation movement. 
Sharing a college lunch, Singer noticed that Keshen chose a meat-free option. The 
discussion that followed on the topic of vegetarianism and the mistreatment of 
particularly farm animals was the start of many more to come. Singer writes:  
What Richard Keshen told me about the treatment of farm animals, 
combined with his arguments against our neglect of the interests of animals, 
gave me a lot to think about, but I was not about to change my diet 
overnight. Over the next two months, together with my wife, Renata, I met 
Richard’s wife, Mary, and the two other Canadian philosophy students, 
Roslind and Stanley Godlovitch, who had been responsible for Richard and 
Mary becoming vegetarians…They had come to see our treatment of non-
human animals as analogous to the brutal exploitation of other races by 
whites in earlier centuries. This analogy they now urged on us, challenging 
us to find a morally relevant distinction between humans and non-humans 
which could justify the differences we make in our treatment of those who 
belong to our own species and those who do not. (Singer, 1986: 149). 
Eventually, Singer writes, he and Renata, ‘if [they] were to retain [their] self-respect 
and to continue to take moral issues seriously’ decided to stop eating animals (1986: 
149).  
 
The extract is significant because it provides an insight into a) the nature of the 
group’s collective behaviour and what made it unique among activists, and b) to the 
ideas that would later become the philosophical underpinnings of Singer’s Animal 
Liberation, which I will discuss in the next section. What is evident from the extract, 
at least as Singer tells it, is a collective commitment not only to an abstinence of 
eating meat, but to the rational, moral justification for that abstinence, and indeed the 
belief that such justification would convince others to abstain. Most members of the 
IOG, to which we could add Richard Ryder, Andrew Linzey, David Wood, Michael 
Peters and Stephen Clark, were professional thinkers in some capacity or other, and so 
members of certain academic worlds or sub-worlds to which rational inquiry is a 
valued form of communication. What this group did that was particularly unique, was 
to publish their moral arguments, not in specialised journals relating to their 
disciplines, but in books directed at a wider audience, the aim being to effect change 
in attitudes and practice at the public level. It was the book edited by the Godlovich’s, 
Animals, Men and Morals (1971), the first to be published by members of the group, 
and its (poor) public reception that led to Singer’s own publication. 
 
‘Profoundly disappointing’ was how Singer described the lack of political and social 
impact of Animals Men and Morals. ‘We had great hopes for it’, he writes, ‘for it 
demanded revolutionary change in our attitudes to and treatment of non-human 
animals’ (Singer, 1986: 150), but the book was ignored for the most part by the 
British press and public alike; the only good news to come from the experience was 
that a publisher had agreed to produce an American edition (Singer, 1986: 150). 
Determined to get a better response in America, Singer decided to write an unsolicited 
review-article in support of the book, which would also incorporate his own views on 
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the subject. He chose The New York Review of Books as the publisher most likely to 
print the review, which they did. The article was accepted and published in April 
1973.  
 
Animals, Men and Morals sold reasonably well and so was moderately successful; 
Singer’s review-article more so. He received numerous letters from the public in 
support of the views expressed in his review-article. It was suggested to him that he 
develop the ideas into a full-length book, which he subsequently did, and which The 
New York Review published in 1975 (Singer, 1986: 151). He writes that the book was 
not an immediate success. In a tone tinged with disappointment, he also writes that it 
seemed to him that the only effect the book was having in the immediate to short term 
‘was to put the question of animals and ethics onto the list of topics discussed in 
applied ethics courses in university philosophy departments’ (Singer, 1986: 151).  
Recalling that his aim and the aim of the IOG generally was to generate, through 
reasoned debate, political advocacy and reform at the public level, ethics about 
animals limited to the social world of the academy and a ‘battle of ideas’ amongst its 
members was a poor substitute. Here again we see how important the alignment of 
professional and everyday worlds was to Singer, this time in the context of society 
writ large. Singer did not see himself as simply a philosopher writing moral theory, 
rather, we might say, in writing moral theory he saw himself as a reformer making a 
moral problem public.  
 
 
The social Impact of ‘Animal Liberation’ 
There was no animal liberation movement prior to the publication of his book, or if 
there was, it certainly did not have the degree of consensus the movement shared after 
the book’s publication, such was its impact. Animal Liberation itself came to be 
tagged the ‘bible of the animal liberation movement’ and James Jasper and Dorothy 
Nelkin (1992: 90) boldly claim that, almost every activist ‘either owns or has read 
[the book]’. The IOG through Singer’s work particularly triggered a widespread 
protest movement, something they had hoped to do from the outset. Indeed it has 
become a worldwide social movement, with liberation organisations operating in, for 
example, Australia, Great Britain, Europe, Canada and the United States. In the 
preface to the book’s second edition, published in 1990 Singer responds to the ‘bible’ 
tag and the success of the movement:  
It is a line that I cannot help find flattering, but it makes me uncomfortable 
at the same time. I don’t believe in bibles: no book has a monopoly on truth. 
In any case, no book can achieve anything unless it strikes a chord in its 
readers. The liberation movements of the Sixties had made Animal 
Liberation an obvious next step: the book drew the arguments together and 
gave them a coherent shape. The rest was done by some very fine, ethically 
concerned hard-working people—first a few individuals, then hundreds and 
now perhaps millions—who make up the Animal Liberation Movement. 
(Singer, 1990: viii) 
 
In the period between the first and second editions of the book, the liberation 
movement in terms of abolishing cruel and unnecessary practices had made some 
significant gains.  Harold Guither summarizes thus:  
  
 
Between the Species, IX, August 2009, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
  
Two decades after Animal Liberation was published, animal activists can 
cite the move away from testing cosmetics on animals, a reduction in [the] 
number of animals used in laboratory experiments, and efforts in Europe to 
make livestock and poultry production less stressful. (Guither, 1998: 20) 
He goes on to say that for Peter Singer particularly it was ‘important to see these 
reforms as stepping stones to further goals, not as the be-all and end-all of the 
campaign’ (Guither, 1998: 20). This view is no better exemplified than in the growth 
or passage of Animal Liberation itself, for the chapters concerning animal 
experimentation and factory farming, which can be seen as arenas of contestation, 
were updated with each edition. Singer writes:  
By the time the first edition was a few years old, I began to hear people 
saying things like “Of course, animal welfare has improved a lot since that 
was written…”. I knew then that it was necessary to document the 
continuing suffering inflicted on animals in laboratories and farms, so as to 
present readers with descriptions that could not be palmed off as belonging 
to some distant dark age. (Singer, 1990: xviii)  
 
Two grassroots level activists who have contributed significantly to the liberation 
movement are Ingrid Newkirk and Henry Spira (now deceased). Both have cited 
Animal Liberation as one of the primary motivators for their involvement. Newkirk 
credits Singer’s book with being the inspiration behind People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA), a liberation organisation she co-founded in 1980 with 
Alex Pacheco, and which boasts a membership in the United States alone of over 750 
000 (Singer, 2003). Spira spearheaded one of the first successful liberation campaigns 
in America, saving a number of cats from painful, pointless experiments conducted by 
researchers at the American Museum of Natural History in 1976 (Singer, 1998: 51-
73). He went on to organise many more successful campaigns and founded the 
liberation group Animal Rights International (ARI) before his death in 1998. 
Regarding Singer’s work and the influence it had on him, Spira writes: 
Singer made an enormous impression on me because his concern for other 
animals was rational and defensible in public debate. It did not depend on 
sentimentality, on the cuteness of the animals in question or their popularity 
as pets. To me he was saying simply that it is wrong to harm others, and as a 
matter of consistency we don’t limit who the others are; if they can tell the 
difference between pain and pleasure, then they have the fundamental right 
not to be harmed. (Spira, 1985: 196) 
 
Singer himself participates in various liberation campaigns. For example, upon Henry 
Spira’s death he became the president of ARI and so active in their grassroots level 
activism (Singer, 2003: para. 6); but perhaps the campaign most notable for his 
involvement is the Great Ape Project, which he co-founded with Paola Cavalieri in 
1993. The group, which includes primatologists, psychologists, and philosophers 
among its members, has called for the United Nations to adopt a Declaration of the 
Rights of Great Apes. Such a declaration would see moral equality extended to 
gorillas, orang-utans and chimpanzees in the form of the right to life, the protection of 
individual liberty and the prohibition of torture. The immediate benefits for apes are 
obvious, particularly for those held in captivity, for example, in research laboratories. 
The long-term benefits as Singer sees them are outlined in the preface to the second 
edition of Animal Liberation. He writes:  
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If it is successful in leading us to include, for the first time, members of a 
nonhuman species within the sphere of beings whom we recognize as 
having basic rights, The Great Ape Project will have served to bridge the 
gap between humans and other species. It will then make it more feasible to 
extend equal consideration to other nonhuman animals as well. (Singer, 
1995: xvii) 
Consistent with writing moral argument as a preferred form of activism, Singer, along 
with Cavalieri, edited a book in which he and other members provide their 
justifications for supporting the declaration and its implementation. The book entitled 
The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity was first published in 1993, 
twenty years after the first publication of Animal Liberation.   
 
In May 2003, the NYRB published Peter Singer’s discussion of ‘Animal Liberation at 
30’. Thirty years had passed since the publication of his review-article, and in thirty 
years, he says, the situation has changed from ‘scarcely anyone [thinking] that the 
treatment of individual animals raised an ethical issue worth taking seriously’ to a 
worldwide advocacy movement of substantial membership (Singer, 2003). The early 
work of the IOG generally and Peter Singer’s in particular and the people whose 
activism the work subsequently inspired, brought to light something that had been 
hidden. Harold Guither sums up thus: 
The writings of philosophers and the actions of their converts have sparked 
innovative and controversial ethical standards for human relationships 
towards animals. Since the 1970s, their writings have activated the latent 
support of millions of citizens, stimulated new movements, driven the 
development of new organizations, and generated intense political activity. 
(Guither, 1998: 13).  
In terms of the movement itself Richard Ryder suggests that it ‘is possibly unique 
among liberation movements in the extent to which it has been led and inspired by 
professional philosophers; rarely has a cause’, he says, ‘been so rationally argued and 
so intellectually well armed’ (Ryder, 2000: 6). 
 
What problem does Singer name? What is its solution? What is animal liberation? 
While Singer’s empirical chapters have been updated with each edition, the first 
chapter, which contains his arguments, has remained the same. Singer writes:  
I have come across no insurmountable objections, nothing that has led me to 
think that the simple ethical arguments on which the book is based are 
anything but sound. (Singer, 1995: xviii-xix) 
Unless otherwise indicated, the ‘simple ethical arguments’ as they appear in the first 
chapter of his book are the focus here rather than any further explanations Singer has 
since published in academic circles. They constitute the arguments as the general 
public read them, and so reflect the style of writing Singer thought most effective in 
the wider social context. Subsequent editions reflect this commitment for he changes 
little, despite the criticisms from peers in the philosophical community. To have 
changed the style, Singer says in a later edition, would have been to change the nature 
of the book itself, to turn it ‘into a work of academic philosophy, of interest to my 
professional colleagues but tedious for the general reader’ (Singer, 1995: xviii). One 
of his critics agrees. Regarding Singer’s continued claims throughout the book that he 
has not merely asserted his views but argued their case, Bill Puka writes:  
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The fact that Singer must make mention of the fact that he has argued for his 
position demonstrates the degree to which his is a practical work, directed at 
a popular audience, for the purpose of social reform. (Puka, 1977: 557)  
 
I turn now to the first chapter of Animal Liberation where in which Singer does not 
merely name the problem and its solution, but argues its case.  
 
 
 
Naming the moral problem and its solution 
In chapter one of Animal Liberation Singer develops at least two ideas first broached 
by the IOG; they are:  one, the connection between the exploitation of other races and 
their liberation from that exploitation to the exploitation/liberation of other animals, 
and two, ‘speciesism’, understood as a prejudice akin to racism or sexism which 
Singer claims underlies animal oppression. Richard Ryder first coined this latter term 
in his essay Experiments on Animals, published in the Godlovich’s Animals, Men and 
Morals (1971). In it he writes:  
In as much as both “race” and “species” are vague terms used in the 
classification of living creatures according, largely, to physical appearance, 
an analogy can be made between them. Discrimination on grounds of race, 
although most universally condoned two centuries ago, is now widely 
condemned. Similarly, it may come to pass that enlightened minds may one 
day abhor “speciesism” as much as they now detest “racism”. The 
illogicality in both forms of prejudice is of an identical sort. If it is accepted 
as morally wrong to deliberately inflict suffering upon innocent human 
creatures, then it is only logical to also regard it as wrong to inflict suffering 
on innocent individuals of other species. (Ryder, 1971: 81) 
Singer begins chapter one of Animal Liberation developing Ryder’s position, but does 
so in a way reflecting his own philosophical commitments and interests.   
 
In his satirical piece A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (1792), Cambridge 
philosopher Thomas Taylor parodied Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (1792). Singer makes use of Taylor’s primary assertion to generate 
his discussion regarding animals. Taylor’s general point was that Wollstonecraft’s 
arguments for the rights of women also held for the rights of ‘brutes’ and in so doing 
were not to be taken seriously. Singer aptly describes Taylor’s argument as follows:  
If the argument for equality was sound when applied to women, why should 
it not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? The reasoning seems to hold for 
these “brutes” too; yet to hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd. 
Therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion had been reached must be 
unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it must also be unsound 
when applied to women, since the very same arguments had been used in 
each case. (Singer, 1975: 1) 
Singer challenges Taylor’s major claim that granting rights to animals is ridiculous 
and his argument runs as follows.  
 
There is nothing absurd about the idea that the basic principle of equality applies to 
animals. The extension of the principle from one group to another does not imply that 
we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant them exactly the same 
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rights. The principle does not require equal or identical treatment; instead what it 
requires is equal consideration. Different groups may require different treatment and 
different rights depending on the nature of their members. To clarify this point as it 
concerns the case for animals, Singer discusses the basis upon which opposition to 
racism or sexism ultimately rests (Singer, 1976: 2-3).  
 
Racism and sexism are not wrong on the basis of factual equality, that is, equality 
does not depend on capacities or abilities that are scientifically discoverable, for 
example on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength or similar matters of fact. 
Racism and sexism are wrong because equality is a moral idea: it is a prescription of 
how we should treat human beings rather than a description of an alleged actual 
equality among humans (Singer, 1976: 4-5).  
 
The Utilitarian school of thought (and here Singer cites Jeremy Bentham’s work) 
frames the principle in this way: ‘the interests of every being affected by an action are 
to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other 
being’ (Singer, 1976: 6). In other words, everyone’s interests ought to be given equal 
consideration, and this includes animals because they indeed have interests. Put 
another way, according to the principle of equality, ‘the taking into account of the 
interests of the being, whatever those interests may be, must…be extended to all 
beings, black, white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman’ (Singer, 1976: 6).  
 
The necessary and indeed sufficient condition that must be met in order to say that a 
being has interests and so the right to equal consideration is the capacity for suffering: 
this capacity is the ‘prerequisite for having interests at all’, and as such is a non-
arbitrary capacity in the way that say the capacities for reasoning and language are 
arbitrary (Singer, 1976: 9). If a being can suffer, the principle of equal consideration 
of interests demands that that being’s suffering be ‘counted equally with the like 
suffering-in so far as rough comparisons can be made- of any other being’ (Singer, 
1976: 9). Sentience then, understood in the very basic sense of the capacity to suffer 
and/or experience enjoyment, is the marker by which concern for the interests of 
others is made (Singer, 1976: 9).  
 
Those prejudiced toward the interests of members of their own species and against 
those members of other species are guilty of ‘speciesism’, just as those prejudiced 
toward the interests of members of their own race or sex and against those members 
of other races or sexes are guilty of racism and sexism respectively. It is on the basis 
of the principle of equal consideration of interests that ‘speciesism’, by analogy with 
racism and sexism, rests (Singer, 1976: 8-9).  
 
Singer goes on to reject the argument that animals do not feel pain and so by 
extension are not deserving of equal consideration, and briefly discusses the 
wrongness of ‘killing’ as it concerns the application of the principle of equality, but 
for the purposes of this discussion there is enough here already to go on with. 
Importantly he claims that most human beings are speciesist, that we take an active 
part, or acquiesce in practices that ‘require the sacrifice of the most important interests 
of members of other species in order to promote the most trivial interests of our own 
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species’ (Singer, 1976: 10). The next two chapters of Animal Liberation, he says, 
represent examples of speciesism in practice. The first focuses on the practice of 
experimentation on animals and the second on the rearing of animals for food, two 
practices which cause more suffering in animals than any other. To stop them, says 
Singer, ‘we must change the policies of our government, and we must change our own 
lives…’ (Singer, 1976: 22-23). Continuing with the theme of experimentation as the 
primary focus or arena of contestation I will be taking a closer look at the content of 
chapter two in the next paper, but before I do, something need be said of the 
argument(s) thus far presented.  
 
If liberation is the solution, what is the moral problem? Simply reading Singer’s 
arguments suggests that the moral problem so named is speciesism: that is, human 
prejudice or bias towards the interests of our own species and against those of non-
human animals. Reading beyond the first chapter the moral problem so named is a 
little more broadly conceived. When we read the factual chapters and look at the 
associated photographs what we are presented with is animal suffering and the 
collective practices that give rise to that suffering. Animal liberation understood in 
relation to these chapters is liberation from the suffering inflicted upon animals by 
humans and not simply from the human attitudes and biases upon which their 
oppression rests, that is, it is liberation from the consequences of speciesism. 
According to Singer, this is the most rational way of naming, understanding and 
seeking a solution. Individual knowers in terms of the anti-speciesist position come to 
know the principle of equal consideration of interests and through using this principle 
as their moral measure, come to decide the right course of action in any given 
circumstance involving the (ab)use of animals. Moreover, in knowing and applying 
these moral concepts, and in providing an objectively based moral justification for 
how people should act regardless of their social, political, historical and cultural 
locations, knowers seemingly come to avoid the charge of sentimentalism. In the 
original preface to Animal Liberation Singer asserts that:  
[his book] exposes the prejudices that lie behind our present attitudes and 
behaviour. In the chapters that describe what these attitudes mean in 
practical terms-how animals suffer from the tyranny of human beings-there 
are passages that will arouse some emotion [but] nowhere in this book, 
however, do I appeal to the reader’s emotions where they cannot be 
supported by reason…The ultimate justification for opposition…is not 
emotional. It is an appeal to basic moral principles which we all accept, and 
the application of these principles to the victims…is demanded by reason, 
not emotion. (Singer, 1976: ix-x) 
  
In contrast to Singer’s view, I suggest that ‘Tools for Research’, his second chapter in 
Animal Liberation, which focuses on the practice of animal experimentation, for 
example, need not be understood in terms of, or as an example of speciesism. There is 
an alternative way of understanding the persuasiveness of this chapter concerning 
animal experimentation that has little to do with an animal’s capacity to suffer or the 
application on our part of basic moral principles that we may or may not all accept, 
and which is no more or no less rational than Singer’s own arguments.  
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In exploring certain questions regarding political and social change concerning the 
treatment animals in Britain since the nineteenth century Hilda Kean writes:  
…I want to implicitly reject the debate that has seemed to characterize so 
much recent academic writing on animals. I am not particularly concerned 
with the philosophical debate as to whether animals have rights or not, since 
this does not seem helpful in explaining adequately the nature of the 
historical practice of people in campaigning to protect animals. My concern 
is with the sort of treatment meted out to animals and the actions that 
women and men have taken to change this, often for the most contradictory 
and inconsistent of motives. (Kean, 1998: 11) 
Kean does acknowledge that campaigners have been influenced to some extent by 
‘the ideas’ of certain philosophers but she makes little reference to their work. It is 
one thing to reject a particular type of philosophical debate; yet another to reject all 
such debate, which she seems to do.  It is unfortunate that she ignores Singer’s work 
particularly on the grounds that it is simply focused on rights (or interests). Reading 
aspects of Singer’s work in conjunction with that of Francis Power Cobbe 
specifically, whom Kean cites as an effective campaigner, does indeed provide insight 
into the practice of those who have participated in changing the lives of animals.  
 
Drawing a line between the work of activists and the work of philosophers regarding 
the treatment of animals is not something unique to Kean. From the other side, 
philosophical debates concerning animal welfare do tend to ignore the work of 
activists in favour of the more theoretical discussions represented by Singer’s first 
chapter in which he lays out his moral argument. For example, in his summary of 
ethics about animals, David De Grazia describes Animal Liberation as the book which 
gave discussions about the moral status of animals intellectual respectability. But he 
focuses his exposition and analysis on the moral arguments Singer presents to the 
exclusion of everything else. No mention is made of the ‘factual chapters’ and their 
moral persuasiveness, as if the chapters are simply an extension of the arguments 
(which is how Singer wants them read), and can be seen in no other way. I use De 
Grazia’s work not to single him out, but to exemplify the standard approach in ethics 
about animals since Singer, and one that I will not be following here.  
  
In order to explore this alternative understanding and maintain the sense of movement 
and process of enactment central to moral passages I resituate ‘Tools for Research’ 
within the larger historical context of activist literature and responses to that literature 
from scientists engaged in the practice. One way to do this is to draw attention to its 
similarities with the work of Frances Power Cobbe, Louise Lind af Hageby and Leisa 
Schartau. In the next paper I identify the similarities in strategies employed by these 
activists as well as the similarities in the criticisms of these strategies made by 
particular members of the scientific social world of physiology, and following this I 
take a closer look at issues raised by the debate drawing on something of Cora 
Diamond's work with which to do so.  
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